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Abstract
We use a unique ﬁrm-level data set merging administrative information on average
workers’ earnings by skill level (blue collars and white collars), Population Census
information on the local stock of human capital and survey information on ﬁrm’s
characteristics to investigate the existence and magnitude of local human capital
externalities in Italian manufacturing. The latter represents an interesting case
study due to the prevalence of small family business and a technological lag with
respect to the US, which most evidence supporting local human capital spillovers
relates to. In spite of this, our estimates show for Italy human capital externalities
similar to the US, which are robust to many variations of the econometric speciﬁ-
cation and to addressing potential endogeneity issues using instrumental variables
estimation.
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Human capital investments have both private and social economic returns. While the
idea that a worker’s own human capital raises her/his labour income has now reached
a wide consensus among economists, empirical research on the social returns to hu-
man capital, for instance on the eﬀect of educated workers on non-educated workers’
productivity and wages, is much scarcer and generally less conclusive.
In what follows we will restrict our attention to one speciﬁc form of human capital
only: tertiary education. Tertiary education represents an interesting educational level
to look at. Indeed, while for primary and secondary educational levels there is in all
developed countries almost universal support for strong government subsidization, in
many countries there is a recent trend towards reducing government spending for ter-
tiary education (e.g., in Italy) or to shift the burden of funding the Higher Education
(HE) system away from the taxpayer and towards students and their families (e.g., in
the UK with the introduction of top-up fees, see Greenaway and Haynes, 2003) based
on the idea that most beneﬁts of HE are privately appropriated. However, in case pos-
itive externalities to HE do exist, reducing public support to HE could have negative
consequences also for non-graduates.
When it comes to studying human capital externalities, Italy represents an interest-
ing case study, mainly for two reasons. The ﬁrst one is that most empirical evidence
supporting the existence of positive human capital externalities relates to the US, which
is a country at the technological frontier. It would be interesting then to assess whether
externalities emerge also for countries and sectors that are late-comers in technological
terms, such as the Italian manufacturing (Faini et al., 1999). The second reason is that
Italy is characterized by very low levels of individual and workers’ geographical mobil-
ity. A relevant feature of human capital is its ‘geographical’ or ‘local’ dimension: it
is embodied in human beings and as a consequence it can be transferred from a place
to another only if they agree to move. As a consequence, some regions or countries
may end up being human capital constrained. In this regard, assessing whether local
communities beneﬁt from the local expansion of HE is also important to inform tertiary
education policies. ‘Local human capital policies’, that is policies aiming at increasing
local access to HE by favoring a wide diﬀusion of university premises within a country
may be particularly important when mobility costs are high and the returns to educa-
tion are relatively low, or not high enough to generate substantial mobility of graduates
such as in Italy, as they might avoid low human capital traps.1
1For some examples of this kind of policies see Currie and Moretti (2003) for the US, Andersson
et al. (2004) for Sweden and Bratti et al. (2008) for Italy.
2In this paper, we investigate human capital externalities using ﬁrm-level average
wage data. The idea is that if externalities exist in production, we should see that
ﬁrms located in geographical areas with high levels of human capital have a higher
productivity and can aﬀord to pay higher average wages than otherwise similar ﬁrms
located in areas with lower levels of human capital. For each ﬁrm, the local level of
human capital is deﬁned as the share of college educated workers among all workers in
manufacturing in the same province in which the ﬁrm is located.2
We make a number of contributions to both the previous general literature on hu-
man capital externalities and the one speciﬁcally related to Italy. First, to the best
of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to match administrative data on wages from the
Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS) with a widely used ﬁrm-level survey
on Italian Manufacturing (the Survey on Italian Manufacturing Firms managed by the
Unicredit banking group, SIMF hereafter).3 This oﬀers two main advantages: 1) INPS
administrative wage data are less likely to be subject to measurement errors compared
to survey data; 2) INPS wage data are available by level of qualiﬁcation (white collars
and blue collars) while SIMF only provides average ﬁrm’s wage data. This enables us to
address the potential issue of ‘standard neoclassical supply eﬀects’ recently emphasized
by Moretti (2004a) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) by estimating separate wage equations
by skill level.4 Second, SIMF data allow us to control for many factors that are po-
tentially correlated with both local human capital and wages (such as a ﬁrm’s physical
capital stock or R&D activities) and that are generally not available in cross-section or
longitudinal worker data (e.g., Moretti, 2004a). This implies that studies using that kind
of data may suﬀer from an omitted variable problem and local human capital may pick
up the eﬀect of unobserved local ﬁrm’s characteristics, as has been recently emphasized
by Moretti (2004c), who uses ﬁrm-level data.5 Third, unlike studies using worker data,
focusing on ﬁrm-level data that also provide information on the skill structure of the
workforce within the ﬁrm enables us to test whether local human capital externalities
emerge over and above spillovers potentially arising within a ﬁrm. This is important
since previous works have shown that human capital spillovers could emerge within a
ﬁrm (see, among others, Battu et al., 2003; Martins and Jin, 2008), and therefore if
2Provinces are the intermediate level in which the Italian territory is organized by the Italian Con-
stitutional Law, the upper level being Regioni and the lower Comuni.
3Some recent papers using the same survey are, for instance, Parisi et al. (2006), Boeri and Garibaldi
(2007) and Benfratello et al. (2008).
4In what follows we will use the words ‘skill’ and ‘qualiﬁcation’ interchangeably.
5Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007a,b), who use cross-section household survey data to estimate human
capital spillovers on individual wages, try to tackle this problem by including aggregated measures of
local physical capital stock in the wage equation.
3ﬁrm’s own human capital is not properly controlled for in the wage equations, local
human capital may simply act as a proxy for it. This also represents an improvement
over Moretti (2004c) who does not have data on ﬁrm’s skill level and has to impute it
from 3-digit industry-city cells from the Census of Manufacturers. Last but not least,
as we already said, unlike most of the previous literature that focuses on the US we
investigate human capital externalities in an industry (Italian manufacturing) that for
its structural characteristics (small family business, ‘mature’ products) cannot be con-
sidered at the frontier of technological progress and for which knowledge spillovers could
be less important.
A central ﬁnding of our paper is that local human capital is positively related to
average wages paid by manufacturing ﬁrms, and that this relation is stronger for white-
collar workers. This evidence is robust to adding several covariates, which might ac-
count for a spurious correlation between local human capital and wages, in the wage
equations. Although we use OLS and the causal interpretation of our estimates may
be questioned, several pieces of evidence suggest that the estimated eﬀects are likely
to capture knowledge spillovers: human capital externalities are indeed larger in ﬁrms
where the main source of knowledge and innovation are external to the ﬁrm, and are
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant when considering the share of college educated
workers in the population or in the workforce rather than in manufacturing, as one
would have expected if the source of the externality were mainly knowledge spillovers.
When instrumental variables (IV) estimation is used to address the potential problem of
endogeneity of local human capital, using instruments based on the (presumably exoge-
nous) lagged expansion of HE supply and lagged demographic structure, our estimates
of local human capital spillovers remain statistically signiﬁcant and are even larger in
size with respect to OLS estimates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a brief survey of the empirical
evidence, both international and speciﬁcally relating to Italy. Section 3 describes the
econometric model. Section 4 summarizes the main characteristics of the data set.
Section 5 reports the empirical results and section 6 concludes.
2 Past empirical evidence on human capital spill-
overs
In this section we report a short and not exhaustive survey of the past empirical evidence
focusing only on recent work investigating human capital externalities using micro-data.
There are several potential sources of local human capital externalities. Moretti (2004b)
4mentions ‘technological externalities’ produced by technological increasing returns (Lu-
cas, 1988). As stated by Lucas (1988) the source of this kind of externalities may be,
for instance, the sharing of knowledge between workers or individuals. Externalities
may also take a pecuniary form, not originating from assumptions about the produc-
tion function but from market interactions like for instance in Acemoglu (1998): an
increase in the supply of human capital could increase R&D investment to introduce
skill-complementary technologies and raise the productivity of skilled workers in the
long-run (skill-bias technological change).
Externalities need not be positive, of course. Moretti (2004b) makes the example of
the signaling model of education. Education could simply be a signal of an individual’s
productivity (ability). If the level of workers’ education increases locally, employers
might simply raise their hiring standards without any positive eﬀect on productivity. In
this case, the social returns to education would be negative: education becomes a social
cost.
As stated by Moretti (2004b), there are diﬀerent ways of testing for the presence
of human capital externalities in production, by looking at wages, production or land
prices. Due to data availability most researchers have used wages and we will do the
same.
To date, the evidence on local human capital externalities is ‘mixed’. Acemoglu and
Angrist (2000) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) investigated local human capital externali-
ties in the US and did not ﬁnd any supporting evidence, while Moretti (2004a,c) using
US data and Muravyev (2008) using Russian data found statistically and economically
signiﬁcant local human capital externalities. Various factors have been identiﬁed as
potentially responsible for this diﬀerence in the results:
1. the proxy of human capital used. While Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Ciccone
and Peri (2006) mainly focus on average years of education, Moretti (2004a,c) and
Muravyev (2008) focus on tertiary education attainment. According to Moretti
(2004a) the focus on higher education rather than on secondary or lower schooling
levels is justiﬁed by the fact that the former is likely to produce market externalities
(e.g., productivity growth) while the latter is likely to mainly produce non-market
eﬀects. The empirical evidence seems to support this claim;
2. the spatial unit considered. The speciﬁc choice of the spatial unit could make a
diﬀerence since as Fu (2007) and Rosenthal and Strange (2008b) show the geo-
graphical spread of knowledge spillovers could be rather limited. This is pretty
intuitive if human capital externalities are produced by knowledge exchanges due
to interactions among individuals or workers: a worker is more likely to interact
5with spatially closer individuals. Hence, focusing on smaller geographical units
(e.g., cities or metropolitan areas rather than states) could help to identify local
human capital externalities. In this respect, while Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)
uses state-level data, all other studies use city-level (or Metropolitan Areas) data;
3. the instruments used. Some studies used IV techniques to identify the causal eﬀect
of local human capital. In this case, also the choice of instruments is likely to make
a diﬀerence. For instance, as stressed by Duranton (2006), the instruments used
by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), i.e. child-labour and compulsory-schooling laws,
are likely to have an eﬀect especially on ‘marginal students’ and to aﬀect lower
schooling levels rather than higher education. Some of the instruments used by
Moretti (2004a) or Muravyev (2008), such as the presence of a land-grant college
for the former or pre-transition levels of tertiary educational achievement and the
historical location of university establishments for the latter, are instead more
likely to aﬀect tertiary education achievement. This is important especially if
externalities only emerge from university educated individuals.
To the best of our knowledge only two studies have addressed the issue of human
capital externalities in Italy using micro-data, and both have considered average years of
education rather than tertiary educational achievement but contrary to the US literature
they have found a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007b) use Italian individual-level data from the Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) run by the Bank of Italy to study human
capital externalities at the local labour market (LLM) level. The authors use as a proxy
of local human capital average years of schooling in the LLM population, taken from
the 1991 Census. They both apply OLS and IV to repeated cross-sections from SHIW
and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of local human capital on individual wages. How-
ever, as emphasized by Moretti (2004a) the evidence of a positive eﬀect of local human
capital on average wages is not necessarily an indication of human capital externalities
but may be produced by imperfect substitutability between skilled and unskilled work-
ers. Then, Dalmazzo and de Blasio proceed to estimate separate wage regressions for
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The eﬀect of local human capital on both wages
is positive, only marginally statistically signiﬁcant for skilled-workers and statistically
signiﬁcant and larger for unskilled workers, as predicted by theory in case of imperfect
skill substitutability. The authors take this as evidence in favour of positive human
capital externalities.
In a closely related paper using the same data, Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007a)
make an important point. If local human capital produces consumption externalities,
6i.e. it increases residents’ utility by raising the quality of life, looking only at wages may
understate the eﬀect of human capital externalities. For instance, assuming that skilled
workers derive higher utility from cities’ amenities than low-skilled workers, they may
accept a lower wage in exchange of a higher quality of the city environment. Hence,
the average wage may remain the same or even fall also in the presence of human
capital production spillovers, depending on the relative magnitude of consumption and
production externalities. The authors estimate a Mincer equation for wages and a
similar equation for rents using both OLS and IV and ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of local
human capital (average years of education in the LLM population)on both rents and
wages. The authors conclude by saying that their results point to the existence of both
production and consumption human capital externalities.6
3 Econometric model
We adopt the Mincer approach by estimating a ﬁrm-level (log) wage regression by skill
level augmented with an indicator of local human capital. In particular, we follow
Moretti (2004a) and estimate the following wage equations for white collars (W) and
blue collars (B), respectively:
wipW = α0 + α1Ki + T
0
iα2 + α3FCSi + α4LCSp + X
0
iα5 + uWi + uWp + Wi (1)
wipB = β0 + β1Ki + T
0
iβ2 + β3FCSi + β4LCSp + X
0
iβ5 + uBi + uBp + Bi (2)
where i is ﬁrm subscript, p is the spatial subscript and W,B are the skill-level subscripts,
respectively. In particular, we consider as the relevant spatial unit Italian provinces,7
which are the administrative equivalent of US counties, and two levels of skills, blue
collars (B) and white collars (W). This distinction is due to the fact that earnings
data come from the Italian National Social Security Institute’s archives (see section
4), which does not collect information on workers’ educational level but only on their
level of qualiﬁcation. wijs is the ﬁrm-level nominal annual average wage for ﬁrm i,
in province j and for skill-level s = W,B in natural logarithm (see Appendix II). We
follow Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2004a) and use nominal wages as
6However, it must be noted that unlike in Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007b), in this paper the authors
disregard the imperfect substitutability argument which might lead to an increase in the average wage
even without production human capital spillovers.
7In Italy in 2001 there were 20 regions (NUTS 2) and 103 provinces (NUTS 3). Since the data
on local human capital is computed using the 2001 Population Census public use micro-ﬁle, which
for privacy reasons does not include a municipality identiﬁer for municipalities with less than 100,000
inhabitants, it is not possible to consider ﬁner geographical disaggregations, such as municipalities or
local labour market systems.
7our dependent variable. Since we are considering manufacturing, a sector producing
traded goods, average productivity has to be higher in provinces where nominal wages
are higher. Ki is the natural logarithm of physical capital intensity, that is the ratio
between the real capital stock and the total number of workers. Ti is a vector of
technological indicators, FCSi is ﬁrm’s human capital proxied by the ﬁrm’s college
share (the share of university graduate workers on total ﬁrm’s employment) and Xi a
vector of other ﬁrm-level controls. LCSj is the local measure of human capital (the
local college share among manufacturing workers) and α4 is the main parameter of
interest. We will interpret a statistically signiﬁcant α4 > 0 as evidence consistent with
positive local human capital spillovers. By contrast, a positive β4 is not necessarily
an indication of positive spillovers, since it might be generated by supply substitution
eﬀects in case of imperfect substitution of workers by educational level.8 A positive
and signiﬁcant β3 in the wage equation for blue collars could be instead interpreted
as evidence consistent with within-ﬁrm human capital spillovers. A positive α3 in the
white-collar wage equations is instead largely expected given that graduates are likely to
be in white-collar occupations and that there are positive individual returns to tertiary
education in Italy. However, since we estimate a wage equation at the ﬁrm-level, α3
is likely to capture not only individual but also within-ﬁrm social returns to higher
education. uis and ups are ﬁrm-level or province-level unobservables, respectively, which
may be correlated with the regressors included in each equation , and is is assumed to be
white noise. A more detailed description of the variables used is available in Appendix
I.
Moretti (2004a) carefully discusses the problem of endogeneity of local human cap-
ital. In particular, the problem is likely to be produced by the correlation between
ﬁrm-level or province-level unobservable characteristics and local human capital. Ex-
amples of unobservables that might generate such correlation are, for instance, demand
shocks to speciﬁc sectors or ﬁrms that may attract skilled workers to a given area and
also raise workers’ productivity (endogenous migration). Moretti (2004a) makes the
example of San Jose in California following the internet boom that drove up demand
for qualiﬁed workers, increased their wages and attracted highly educated workers in
the area. This could also be seen as a problem of reverse causality in case of endoge-
nous mobility, that is one is likely to ﬁnd a higher supply of human capital in areas
where ﬁrms pay higher wages to highly educated workers. In this case OLS estimates
would be biased upward. However, the bias needs not be necessarily positive. Indeed,
since workers in Italian manufacturing are often low skilled, high wages oﬀered by local
8As local human capital increases unskilled workers become relatively scarcer and their wage in-
creases.
8manufacturing ﬁrms raise the opportunity cost of university education, and may create
a disincentive to investing in human capital. A classical example is that of the Veneto
region, which is characterized by an industrial structure based on manufacturing, and
by low unemployment rates and high university drop-out rates (Di Pietro, 2006). In this
case, unobservable factors positively aﬀecting local manufacturing ﬁrm’s productivity
might be negatively correlated with the accumulation of local human capital and OLS
estimates could be biased downward. As noted by Moretti (2004a), in general ﬁnding
proxies for all possible unobservables is not a viable solution to the problem and an
alternative is resorting to IV techniques. This poses, of course, the uneasy task of ﬁnd-
ing variables correlated with the local college share but not with average wages paid by
ﬁrms.
In section 5, we will make an attempt to address the issue of endogeneity of local
human capital using IV. It must be noted that like for previous studies other controls
that we include in the right-hand-side of equations (1)-(2), such the ﬁrm’s college share
or capital stock, might be endogenous. Since ﬁnding suitable instruments to address
also their endogeneity is unfeasible with our data, we will limit ourselves here to lag
them, so as they will be at least predetermined with respect to the dependent variables
and the error terms in the wage equations.
As we said, our empirical speciﬁcation oﬀers some advantages with respect to both
Moretti (2004a) and Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2007b), among others. Using ﬁrm-level
data we are able to control for many ﬁrm-level characteristics that might simultane-
ously aﬀect ﬁrm’s productivity and attract human capital locally (such as ﬁrm’s capital
intensity or investments in R&D or ICT). Moreover, our speciﬁcation enable us to as-
sess whether local human capital externalities emerge over and above ﬁrm-level skill
spillovers.9
4 Data
We proxy the local stock of human capital with the share of manufacturing workers
with a tertiary degree at province level computed on the public use microdata ﬁle of
the 2001 Italian Population Census.10 Our choice deserves some comments. As we will
include in the wage equations controls for ﬁrms’ physical capital stock and technological
inputs, our local human capital variable is aimed at mainly capturing learning rather
9This is also done in Moretti (2004c) that investigates local human capital spillovers by estimating
establishment-level production functions in US manufacturing.
10In particular, we consider as tertiary degrees university diplomas, university undergraduate and
postgraduate degrees and non-university tertiary education.
9then pecuniary spillovers, that is those emerging from the exchange of work-related
knowledge between workers. For this reason we use as a proxy of local human capital
the tertiary educational achievement only of workers in the Manufacturing sector. The
idea is that work-related knowledge is more likely to be exchanged between workers, and
to induce an increase in ﬁrm’s productivity the more workers’ job tasks are similar.11 For
this reason, we prefer to compute a sector-speciﬁc measure of local human capital.12 We
use the public use microdata ﬁle of the 2001 Italian Population Census released by the
Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) gathering information on a representative
sample of 1,117,928 individuals, 2% of the total Italian population in 2001. The share
of university educated workers in manufacturing by province is computed using sample
weights which expand the sample to the whole Italian population (see Appendix I).13
The college share in manufacturing varies across Italian provinces. The average share in
our sample is 0.05, with a maximum of 0.13 for the province of Rome (Italy’s capital)
and a minimum of 0.02 for the province of Lecce (Puglia region, Southern Italy).
‘Wage’ data are gathered by the National Institute of Social Security (INPS). In
particular, data refer to average ﬁrm’s annual wages by skill-level (blue collars and
white collars). These data have advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage
is that these data come from an administrative source and are likely to be less af-
fected by measurement error compared to the self-declared survey data normally used
in individual-level studies. The main disadvantage is that, unlike those studies, we are
unable to compute a measure of hourly wages since INPS does not provide informa-
tion on working hours.14 Hence, despite our measure of average annual earnings being
adjusted for part-time work in terms of days (see Appendix II), the variable mixes in-
formation on hourly wages with the one on hours worked. For instance, a higher local
stock of human capital might induce a higher competition for promotions among college
educated workers and a higher eﬀort among white collars, e.g. longer working hours
(cf. Rosenthal and Strange, 2008a). This would cause some problems for the interpre-
tation of our estimates since in this case an increase in annual labour earnings that is
11This idea is not new in economics and dates back to Marshall (1890). Also (Moretti, 2004c) recently
shows that human capital spillovers are stronger among ‘economically close’ sectors.
12Previous studies have considered a variety of deﬁnitions of local human capital. Dalmazzo and
de Blasio (2007b,a) and Muravyev (2008) focus on the whole population, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000),
Moretti (2004a) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) focus on all workers and Moretti (2004c) on workers in
Manufacturing only.
13Like most of the empirical literature on the topic, we focus in this paper on spillovers that arise
from the share of college graduates, although spillovers may also arise from the number and the density
of graduates.
14This often happens also with administrative data from other countries (cf. Dustmann et al., 2009,
for Germany).
10produced by an increase in working hours could be wrongly ascribed to a rise in hourly
productivity (i.e. hourly wage). We will address this and other issues in Section 5.1.2.15
Firm data come from SIMF, which is currently managed by the Unicredit banking
group. The survey collects information on a sample of manufacturing ﬁrms with 11-500
employees and on all ﬁrms with more than 500 employees. The SIMF has been repeated
over time at three-year intervals since 1991 and in each wave a part of the sample is ﬁxed
while the other part is completely renewed every time (see Capitalia, 2002, p. 39). This
helps to analyse both variations over time for the ﬁrms observed in diﬀerent waves (panel
section) and the structural changes of the Italian economy, for the part of the sample
varying in each wave. Like many other surveys used in the empirical literature, also
SIMF is not representative of micro-ﬁrms. The data set gathers a wealth of information
on: balance sheet data integrated with information on the structure of the workforce and
governance aspects; R&D expenditures and ICT; international activities (e.g., export,
FDI ﬂows); information on ﬁnancial structure and strategies. Information about the
educational level of the workforce, the ﬁrm’s college share that we include as a control
in equations (1) and (2), is reported only for the ﬁnal year in each wave. Given that we
can be conﬁdent about our measure of local human capital only for 2001, the year of the
Census, while we do not have good measures of local human capital for other years, we
limit our analysis to 2001. In particular, we merge the 8th-9th-waves panel of SIMF with
2001 Census data and INPS data for 2001.16 In the empirical analysis we analyze wages
in 2001 (INPS) by relating them to local human capital in 2001 (Population Census)
and to lagged ﬁrm-level variables referring to 1998-2000 coming from the 8th SIMF’s
wave.
5 Results
In this section we report the main results of the empirical analysis by distinguishing
between the econometric speciﬁcations using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the ones
using IV.
15However, this problem is likely to be more relevant for blue collars than for white collars, since for
the latter overtime work is usually unpaid.
16The merging procedure between SIMF and INPS data was made under a conﬁdentiality agreement
at the INPS Head Oﬃce (Rome). See Appendix II for more detailed information.
115.1 OLS estimates
5.1.1 Main results
Tables 2 and 3 report the OLS estimates using as dependent variable ﬁrm’s (log) average
wages for white collars and blue collars, respectively. Since our primary focus is on
human capital spillovers we report only the coeﬃcients on local human capital and
some other regressors of particular interest. In both tables, each column progressively
add controls to address potential issues of endogeneity of local human capital or the
ﬁrm’s college share, which might be generated by province-level or ﬁrm-level omitted
variables. The speciﬁcations with the same column number in the two tables include
the same covariates.
Column (1) includes the local human capital stock measured as the share of workers
with a university degree in manufacturing at province-level. The coeﬃcients on local
human capital are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in both wage
equations. A one percent point (p.p., hereafter) increase in the share of workers with
a degree in manufacturing at province level is associated with a 1.4 percent and a 1
percent increase in the wages of white collars and blue collars, respectively.
The coeﬃcient on local human capital in column (1) cannot be interpreted as an
indicator of local human capital spillovers since ﬁrms in provinces with a larger share
of college educated workers in manufacturing will also be more likely to hire university
graduates. Hence, this coeﬃcient is likely to partly capture the eﬀect of the ﬁrm’s
college share. For this reason in column (2) we add the ﬁrm-level college share, i.e.
the share of workers with a university degree employed in the ﬁrm. We also add as a
further control the share of workers with upper secondary schooling working within the
ﬁrm. The coeﬃcients on local human capital remain positive but are slightly reduced in
size in both wage equations and continue to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Increasing by one p.p. local human capital is now associated to an increase in white
collars’ wages of 1.3 percent and blue collars’ wages of 0.9 percent. The eﬀects of a one
p.p. increase in the ﬁrm’s college share on wages are 0.34 percent and 0.08 percent,
for white collars and blue collars respectively. The eﬀects of a one p.p. increase in the
secondary school ratio is instead associated to a 0.03 and a 0.05 percent increase in white
collars and blue collars wages respectively. The results on the two ﬁrms’ skill ratios go in
the expected direction: the ﬁrm college share is statistically signiﬁcant and larger in the
white-collar equation, while the secondary school ratio is signiﬁcant and larger in the
blue-collar equation. Indeed, while skills acquired in upper secondary school, especially
in vocational tracks, are likely to raise especially blue collars’ productivity, skills aquired
at university are likely to raise white collars’ productivity.
12In order to clean out the eﬀects of human capital from other local characteristics
which might simultaneously aﬀect ﬁrms’ productivity and education of the workforce,
column (3) includes region ﬁxed eﬀects, province-level male unemployment rates in the
population aged 15-24 and a dummy for the presence of university campuses in the
province in 2000. Unemployment is likely to impact negatively on wages and positively
on local human capital accumulation (due to lower opportunity costs of education),
while the presence of universities campuses within the province might produce positive
spin-oﬀs with ﬁrms and have a positive eﬀect both on local human capital and wages.
Region ﬁxed eﬀects capture other region-level unobservables. By including region ﬁxed
eﬀects the eﬀect of local human capital is now identiﬁed by between-province variation
within regions. The main consequence of including such controls is to reduce the size
of the coeﬃcient on local human capital in both wage equations. The eﬀects of a one
p.p. increase in local human capital go down to 1 percent for white collars and to 0.8
percent for blue collars, and are both statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Given the potential complementarity between human capital and other forms of cap-
ital, a possible source of correlation between education and wages is that ﬁrms located
in areas in which there are relatively more university graduates, or that hire relatively
more graduates, might also invest more in physical and technological capital (pecuniary
externalities). An alternative hypothesis is that causality might go exactly in the op-
posite direction, ﬁrms investing more in technology might also require better educated
workers. In order to control for these potential eﬀects, column (4) includes (log) physical
capital intensity as an additional regressor and column (5) adds to the speciﬁcation some
indicators of technological capital, namely R&D intensity (i.e. the ratio between R&D
workers and total employment), a dummy for having invested in ICT and a dummy for
R&D cooperation with universities. The eﬀects of local human capital rise and go up
to 1.1 percent and 0.9 percent for white collars and blue collars, respectively. Including
proxies of technological capital (column (5)) has no appreciable eﬀect neither on the
coeﬃcient on local human capital nor on that on the ﬁrm college share with respect to
the previous speciﬁcation. From column (5) the elasticities of white collar’s and blue
collar’s wages to the physical capital stock are 3.2 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively.
Technological inputs are not strongly signiﬁcant in both equations. Hence, our results
show that, unlike for the US, for a relatively laggard country in terms of technology
such as Italy higher ﬁrm’s investments in physical and technological capital cannot be
considered as the main channel through which local human capital spillovers take place,
at least in Manufacturing(cf. Iranzo and Peri, 2006).
Probably the stock of physical capital and the proxies of the ﬁrm’s technological level
we included do not fully capture all the potential heterogeneity existing across diﬀerent
13industries. We know from the rich literature on inter-industry wage diﬀerentials that
ﬁrms in some industries consistently pay higher wages and hire more educated workers
(see Katz and Summers, 1989). Alternatively, ﬁrms operating in those industries may be
more likely to locate in areas where human capital is abundant. To test these hypotheses
we include in column (6) dummies for 2-digit ATECO industries (see Appendix I). The
coeﬃcients on local human capital are reduced in size. One p.p. increase in the fraction
of college graduates working in manufacturing is associated to a 0.7 percent increase
in wages of white collars and a 0.4 percent increase in the wages of blue collars. The
coeﬃcient on local human capital remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level only
in the white-collar equation.
As we already said, the inter-industry wage diﬀerentials literature has emphasized
that ﬁrms’ market power might allow them to pay rents to their workers, and that this
might attract high ability or better educated workers. Along with industries (which may
be more or less exposed to competition) another proxy of a ﬁrm’s market power may be
ﬁrm size, which is then added in column (7). The results are robust and very similar to
those in the previous column. The coeﬃcient on ﬁrm size is positive and signiﬁcant in
both wage equations.
Column (8) adds some controls for other potential determinants of ﬁrms’ productivity
and demand for human capital: export status and FDI ﬂows. Indeed, the trade literature
has emphasized the skill-bias of trade in the developed countries, and the potential
positive correlation between ﬁrm wages and a ﬁrm’s internationalization modes (see,
for instance Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1997). The results remain quantitatively and
qualitatively similar. An increase of one p.p. in the fraction of college educated workers
at the province level is associated to a 0.7 percent increase in white collars’ wages and
to a 0.4 percent increase in blue collar’s wages. The last eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant
only at the 10% level. Both exporting and FDI ﬂows are positively and signiﬁcantly
associated with white collars’ wages while the former is negatively associated with blue
collars’ wages.
Summarizing, we ﬁnd a positive association between local human capital and both
white collars’ wages and blue collar’s wages. However, while the former correlation
remains statistically signiﬁcant also after controlling for many covariates which might
account for such an association, the latter looses statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% in
our most general speciﬁcation. As stressed in section 3 these results overall could be
interpreted as evidence in favour of positive province-level human capital spillovers. The
order of magnitude of the local human capital spillovers we estimate with OLS is in line
with that found by Moretti (2004a,c) for the US and by Muravyev (2008) for Russia.
145.1.2 Robustness checks and further analysis
In this section we investigate the robustness of our results to a number of changes made
to the econometric speciﬁcation of the wage equations. We use as a baseline speciﬁcation
the one estimated in column (8) of Tables 2 and 3, which we will refer to as our “basic”
speciﬁcation. All these robustness checks are reported in Table 4.
Working hours. We already anticipated in section 4 that since we do not have data
on working hours, our estimates of the externalities could capture the combined eﬀect
of local human capital on both working hours and hourly wage. For this reason, we
used the 2001 Italian labour force survey data to create province-sector-skill cells and
computed the average number of weekly working hours. We used 12 2-digit ATECO
sectors for Manufacturing.17 Weekly working hours were included in speciﬁcation (8) in
Tables 2 and 3 and the estimates are reported in model (1) in Table 4. It is possible
to note that including the number of working hours does not produce any signiﬁcant
change to our estimates.
Workers’ characteristics. Using ﬁrm-level data does not allow us to control for some
workers’ characteristics which are likely to be correlated with wages, and potentially also
with local human capital. We used the 2001 Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) data
to compute statistics for average workers’ experience and seniority (in months) and the
percentage of female workers by province-sector-skill cells and province-size-skill cells
for manufacturing ﬁrms.18 Due to small or empty cell size problems it was not possible
to compute such statistics for province-sector-size-skill cells. Because of small or empty
cell size problems, we had to consider only three broad categories for ﬁrm size (11-100,
101-500, more than 500) and all the 14 two-digit ATECO sectors for Manufacturing.
Model (2) shows no noticeable change when experience, seniority and the percentage of
female workers, matched by ﬁrm sector, are included in the regressions. By contrast,
model (3) shows that when the same variables are matched by ﬁrm size the coeﬃcient on
local human capital looses statistical signiﬁcance in the BC equation while the estimate
for the white-collar equation is robust. Model (3) and (4) control for working hours,
experience, seniority and the percentage of female workers matched in the two diﬀerent
17DF, DG and DH industries were aggregated. ATECO codes for Manufacturing are: DA (food
products, beverages and tobacco), DB (textiles and textile products), DC (leather and leather products),
DD (wood and wood products), DE (pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing), DF
(coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel), DG (chemicals, chemical products and man-made
ﬁbres), DH (rubber and plastic products), DI ( non-metallic mineral products), DJ (basic metals and
fabricated metal products), DK (machinery and equipment), DL (electrical and optical equipment),
DM (transport equipment), DN (other manufacturing).
18For a description of the WHIP data set see Contini et al. (2009). We used WHIP since the
information on ﬁrm size was not publicly released in the 2001 Italian labour force survey data.
15ways. The results for the white-collar equation are very robust while model (4) shows a
reduction in the signiﬁcance and magnitude of the coeﬃcient on local human capital in
the blue-collar equation.
Diﬀerential eﬀect of local human capital and province-level unobservables. Since our
measure of local human capital is at province level, there is always the fear that some
other local factors correlated with local human capital, which are not captured by region
ﬁxed eﬀects, could drive our results. To address this issue, we use a strategy similar to
the one used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Guiso et al. (2004), among others. If we
make an assumption on which ﬁrms are more likely to beneﬁt from local human capital
externalities, then we can test whether ceteris paribus those ﬁrms perform better if they
are located in provinces with a higher stock of local human capital, after controlling for
ﬁxed local characteristics (i.e. province ﬁxed eﬀects). We implement this strategy by
considering the diﬀerential eﬀect of local human capital on ﬁrms with diﬀerent Pavitt
sectors.19 We divided Pavitt sectors among those where the main source of knowledge
and innovation is internal R&D (Scale-intensive and Science-based) and those where the
main sources of innovation are not based on ﬁrm’s internal R&D (Supplier dominated
and Specialised Supplier) but are external. The idea is that while in the former worker’s
knowledge is mostly produced internally, is speciﬁc to the ﬁrm and can be hardly trans-
ferred among ﬁrms, in the latter, since knowledge can be more easily transferred among
ﬁrms, a ﬁrm’s workers are more likely to beneﬁt from the knowledge of workers em-
ployed in other ﬁrms. We tested this hypothesis in model (6) by including to the basic
speciﬁcation an interaction term between local human capital and a dummy indicator
for ﬁrms classiﬁed as Supplier dominated or Specialised Supplier. In line with our the-
oretical predictions, the coeﬃcient on local human capital is larger in Scale-intensive
and Science-based sectors for white collars, while the eﬀect on blue collar’s wages is not
statistically diﬀerent among the two types of ﬁrm.
Human capital externalities vs. other ‘local’ eﬀects. In general it is diﬃcult to sepa-
rately identify human capital externalities from agglomeration eﬀects. This is the case
since human capital externalities could account for a substantial part of agglomeration
economies (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2008b). For this reason we did not include the
province population in our regressions, since this would cause over-controlling. Indeed,
when we take some proxies of agglomeration eﬀects commonly used in the literature,
such as the population mass in the province for urbanization eﬀects (urban agglomera-
tions) or the number of manufacturing workers in the province for localization eﬀects (cf.
Rosenthal and Strange, 2004), the correlation coeﬃcients with local human capital are
19Pavitt’s taxonomy categorizes industrial ﬁrms along trajectories of technological change according
to sources of technology, requirements of the users, and appropriability regime (Pavitt, 1984).
16very high and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The high correlation is likely to create multi-
collinearity problems. This is indeed conﬁrmed by the fact that when both population
(or number of manufacturing workers) and local human capital are jointly included in
the white-collar equation they are statistically insigniﬁcant, while both population (or
number of manufacturing workers) and local human capital are signiﬁcant when they
are included separately. The same happens with blue collar’s wages. Hence, although
in model (6) we show that our estimates of human capital externalities are generally
robust to including province ﬁxed eﬀects (which partly control for agglomeration eﬀects
if they work in the same way on all ﬁrms), one might still believe that the coeﬃcient
on local human capital in our basic speciﬁcation may be capturing the eﬀect of other
province-level factors that have nothing to do with the transfer of knowledge among
workers. If this were the case we should ﬁnd that other proxies of local human capital,
such as the share of workers in all sectors with a university degree or the share of uni-
versity educated population, should have similar eﬀects on the wage of white collars and
blue collars to the share of graduate workers in manufacturing. In model (7) we use as
a proxy of local human capital the share of all workers with a university degree, while
in model (8) we use the share of university educated population. These two alternative
measures of local human capital turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant and their co-
eﬃcients are remarkably lower in magnitude. We interpret this evidence as consistent
with the fact that local human capital in our basic speciﬁcation is likely to be capturing
learning externalities rather than other forms of agglomeration externalities or province-
level eﬀects, since knowledge transfer is likely to be larger among workers working in
the same industry (i.e. Manufacturing) and performing therefore similar tasks.
Firm size. We use ﬁrm-level data and we do not have establishment data. This
means that we might be wrongly attributing local human capital to ﬁrms, since local
human capital was attributed to ﬁrms by considering the location of the head quarter.
For this reason, in model (9) we run our estimations in two separate samples including
small ﬁrms (≤50 employees), which are unlikely to be multi-unit, and large ﬁrms (>50
employees). Our estimates show a positive correlation between local human capital and
white-collar wages for both categories of ﬁrms, while the positive correlation between
blue-collar wages and local human capital turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant only
for larger ﬁrms.
Graduates’ quality. Although as we will argue in Section 5.2 the geographical mo-
bility of Italian graduates is quite limited and on average we don’t expect graduates to
be of better quality where the college share is higher, endogenous mobility cannot be
completely ruled out, especially for South to North migrations.20 In case of endogenous
20Actually, the correlation may be of the opposite sign, the average quality of graduates may fall in
17migration a positive coeﬃcient on local human capital may capture a better average
quality of graduates employed by the ﬁrm in areas where the college share is higher. A
way to address this issue is by allowing the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm’s college and sec-
ondary school shares to vary across provinces (see, Moretti, 2004c). The estimates in
model (10) show that allowing heterogeneity in the eﬀect of ﬁrm’s human capital on
average wages has no appreciable eﬀect on the coeﬃcient on local human capital for
white collars.
Non-linearities. As a last robustness check we explored the potential existence of
nonlinearities in the eﬀect of local human capital. There are several reasons to expect
possible nonlinearities in the eﬀect of local human capital. The ﬁrst one is that une-
ducated workers might learn more than proportionally with the increase of the college
share, for instance because it becomes simpler to meet (and interact with) college grad-
uates. That is the relation between local human capital and wages might be increasing
and convex. By contrast, it might be the case that above a given threshold, a further
increase in the college share does not produce any further increase in productivity, since
there are already many graduates from whom non-graduates can learn, that is the re-
lation may be increasing and concave. We observe that given the quite low percentage
of graduates in manufacturing, the ﬁrst hypothesis is more credible for Italy. Another
potential source of non-linear eﬀects might be a quantity-quality trade-oﬀ for gradu-
ates. As HE expands and the college share increases, one might expect graduates to
be increasingly drawn from the bottom part of the ability distribution, that is grad-
uates may be of a lower average quality (see Carneiro and Lee, 2009). In this case,
the spillovers of local human capital may fall after the college share reaches a given
threshold. However, this is not necessarily true, if the HE expansion mainly beneﬁts
able but credit constrained individuals. We investigate potential non-linearities in the
eﬀect of local human capital by estimating a quadratic function in college share and by
allowing diﬀerent slopes for provinces with college share above and below the sample
median (0.0488), respectively.21 Model (11) reports the result of the ﬁrst exercise. The
two coeﬃcients of the quadratic function are never statistically signiﬁcant, due to the
high correlation between the linear and the quadratic terms in local college share (0.98
in both the white-collar and the blue-collar samples). By contrast, the results for model
(12) show that the slope of the average ﬁrm wage-local human capital relationship is
increasing in local college share: the eﬀect above the median is almost 80% higher than
provinces where the expansion of HE is higher if one focuses only on the local production (and not
import) of graduates, see the following point.
21We used the median of the white-collar sample for both white-collar and blue-collar samples. In
the blue-collar sample the median is slightly lower (0.0481).
18that below the median. Although, due to the limited variation in the college share,
we are not able to further explore potential nonlinearities in the eﬀect of local human
capital, we simply observe that the results obtained from a linear speciﬁcation may
understate the real magnitude of local human capital spillovers.
5.2 Instrumental variables estimates
Although we made an eﬀort to include many covariates which if omitted may produce
correlation between local human capital and the error terms in the wage equations, we
cannot be absolutely sure that some other relevant factors have not been omitted from
the wage equations and that there might still be an endogeneity problem. A possible
way to address this problem and to identify the causal eﬀect of local human capital on
average wages at ﬁrm-level is using IV methods.
Before discussing our identiﬁcation strategy we would like to make a point. The
problem of reverse causality of local human capital with productivity and wages, that is
the fact that graduates could migrate towards provinces where ﬁrms pay higher wages, is
likely to be less severe for Italy than for other countries where graduates are very mobile,
such as the US (Bound et al., 2004). This is the case since individual geographical mo-
bility is relatively low in Italy compared to other developed countries. Di Addario (2006)
and Di Addario and Patacchini (2008), for instance, observe that non-pecuniary bene-
ﬁts from residence (social networks, friendship) and substantial mobility costs related
to travel and housing are likely to be responsible for the low workers’ geographical mo-
bility in Italy. This means that the ability of ﬁrms to attract human capital from other
provinces is generally limited and that human capital must be produced locally. How-
ever, a possible endogeneity problem might also be caused by individuals in provinces
with a higher expected future demand for graduates, and higher expected future wages,
enrolling more frequently in HE. In this regard, we note that local production of human
capital is a lengthy process22 and individuals are often unable to make correct long-term
predictions on wages when enrolling in HE.23 Moreover, Italian university students ap-
pear to be systematically mismatched with respect to labour demand. In particular,
there is a systematic excess production of graduates in Arts and Humanities, which are
also the least economically rewarding subjects, and a deﬁcit of graduates in scientiﬁc
22The legal duration of most university degrees in Italy was 4-5 years in the period under study,
although actual duration was much larger.
23Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Betts (1996), for instance, cast serious doubts on students’ ability
to correctly predict earnings. These studies generally show a large heterogeneity in students’ expecta-
tions about actual earnings, which reﬂect a large variation in students’ information.
19and technical degrees, which command higher returns in the labour market.24 Then,
overall, there are serious doubts about the fact that individuals when making educa-
tional choices can correctly anticipate future changes in the labour market. It must also
be noted that also the issue that more productive ﬁrms tend to move where there is
more local human capital is not particulary relevant for the Italian case. Michelacci and
Silva (2007) using the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
data for 1991-1995 show for instance that in Italy about 79% of entrepeneurs established
ﬁrms in the same province where they were born (‘local ﬁrms’). The authors also show
that ‘local ﬁrms’ are generally larger, have a higher value and are more capital inten-
sive, which suggests that ﬁrms established by non-local enterpreneurs (movers) are not
necessarily better (e.g., more productive).
Despite these considerations, we cannot exclude of course that local human capital
is endogenous, and for this reason we make use of IV estimation.
To identify the causal eﬀect of local human capital using IV we need to ﬁnd some
variables aﬀecting the current stock of local human capital in manufacturing, as we
deﬁned it, but that are uncorrelated with the average wages currently paid by manu-
facturing ﬁrms. Hence, we need something speciﬁcally related to manufacturing. To
build such instruments we proceed as follows. First, we identify graduates who are
more likely to be employed in manufacturing ﬁrms. They typically are graduates from
technical and science degrees (engineering, chemistry, and mathematical, physics and
natural sciences) or hard social sciences degrees (economics, business and economics,
banking, statistics). We deﬁne these as “manufacturing-related” ﬁelds. Using the Ital-
ian Ministry of Education University and Research (MIUR) data on university supply
we computed the number of manufacturing-related university degree courses in 1990
and 1995 and their density per 10 square km in each province (by dividing the course
supply by the province surface in 10 square km). Then, we computed the diﬀerence in
manufacturing related courses density by province between 1990 and 1995, which we
deﬁne ∆UNIV and that represents our ﬁrst instrument.25 We consider the change in
supply instead of the lagged value of course density in 1990, since by time diﬀerencing
course density we are likely to purge out any time-invarying province-level unobservable
characteristic aﬀecting university supply that might also be correlated with current wage
levels (i.e. the error terms in the wage equations). There were large diﬀerences in the
change of university supply across provinces. For instance, in our estimation sample for
24OECD (2008) reports for instance that in 2004 the percentage of graduates in Arts and Humanities
was 19% compared to an OECD average of 12%.
25The choice of 1990 is determined by data availability. Indeed, from MIUR we have detailed infor-
mation on university supply by province and faculty only starting from that year. We choose 1995 as
the ﬁnal year since, as we said, during the 90s the legal duration of most degrees was 4 or 5 years.
20white collars the change in the density (per square km) of manufacturing-related degree
courses ranges between -0.02 (Pesaro province) and 2.88 (Trieste province). Since the
increase of local supply of manufacturing-related courses does not necessarily predict
per se an increase in the college share in manufacturing, we use as a second instrument
its interaction with the fraction of the population aged 5-14 in 1982, which is a proxy
of the potential demand for HE. Individuals aged 5-14 are those who were more likely
to enter university during 1990-1995, the period which our variable of supply expansion
refers to.26 An advantage oﬀered by our instrument is that by interacting the change
in local university supply with the lagged demographic structure in the province, it will
mainly capture the local production of graduates and help to address potential issues of
endogenous migration of college educated workers towards high-productivity (i.e. wage)
provinces.27 In order to control for other forms of university spillovers, we include among
the covariates a dummy for the presence of a manufacturing-related faculty (as deﬁned
above) in the province in 2000.
We exploit diﬀerences in past province-speciﬁc HE education policies, in terms of HE
supply expansion, to identify the eﬀect of the local college share.28 Our idea is to use
something that shifts the supply curve of HE but not the demand for HE. One potential
threat to our identiﬁcation strategy could be caused by the non-random lagged (between
11 and 6 years) expansion of the HE supply across provinces with respect to current
ﬁrms’ productivity. However, the Italian university system was subject to an intense
process of reform during the 90s, which made it easier for HE institutions to open new
campuses or faculties and start new degree courses with respect to the past. Indeed,
before the reform, the opening of new universities, faculties or degrees required a law
to be approved by the Italian Parliament (Bratti et al., 2008). This generated a fast
and sizeable expansion in the number of courses and university premises in Italy that
can be considered as random with respect to ﬁrms’ productivity. Indeed, the expansion
mainly followed the needs of HE institutions’ faculty and of the local politicians rather
than those of local students and ﬁrms. Consider, for instance, the following assessment
published by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR, 1997,
p. 10 - our translation):
In respect of the development and rebalancing of university educational sup-
ply, which had to be carried out on a regional basis, a large number of actions
26The modal age at entry into HE in Italy is 18-19.
27Unless such forward-looking migration took place 20-year earlier. In any case, due to the age group
we consider (5-14), residence is likely to have been decided not directly by individuals but by their
parents.
28A similar identiﬁcation strategy is used by Fortin (2006) who estimates the eﬀect of own-cohort
relative supply on college wage premia for US states.
21were carried out: 4 new universities were founded, 2 private universities be-
came state universities, 17 new sites were created, 41 new faculties were
instituted and no less than 230 new degrees were created (adding to the 890
existing in 1986). Nevertheless, (...) these actions were not planned taking
into account the educational demand expressed by each region, or evaluat-
ing the potential ﬂow of students (i.e. evaluating the potential demand for
each action), the employment perspectives (i.e. the competences and skills
required by the country) or the potential of existing facilities. Ultimately,
these actions lacked accurate assessments regarding either their comprehen-
sive scope or their compatibility with the pre-existing situation. In fact, the
main purpose of the programmes seemed to be a geographical rebalancing of
universities premises in order to bring the supply of education closer into
line with the demand, whereas issues such as the real extent of that demand
(which was sometimes so small as to make an eﬃcient and eﬀective endeav-
our impossible) and the situation regarding infrastructures, accommodation
and ﬁnancial support available to students were disregarded. Once again an
indiscriminate and ill-directed approach prevailed, inspired by a barely incre-
mental purpose...
Another factor that might cause our instruments to fail could be the endogeneity
of the age structure with respect to local unobservable determinants of manufacturing
ﬁrm’s productivity. This would happen in our case if: i) individuals who were pre-
dicting in 1982 a larger future increase in manufacturing ﬁrms’ productivity in certain
provinces moved to these provinces and had at the same time a larger number of 5-14
aged children; ii) if individuals decided to have a higher number of children in view of
a larger expected future increase in manufacturing ﬁrms’ productivity and that their
fertility timing generated a higher proportion of 5-14 years old population in 1982. We
think that given the fact that we lag demographic structure by 20 years and that we
focus on a very speciﬁc age group29 (5-14 aged population) the occurrence of all such
circumstances is rather unlikely and we are fairly conﬁdent that our instrument can
be considered exogenous. Since the lagged demographic structure might be related to
the age and experience of manufacturing workers in 2001, we use as base speciﬁcations
for IV estimation the models (4) and (5) in Table 4, which control for working hours,
workers’ experience and seniority and the percentage of female workers.
Table 5 shows the results of our IV estimation. We report for each skill level the
29Indeed, this would require on individuals not only changing their reproductive behaviour in terms
of the quantity of children but also a ﬁne tuning in terms of fertility timing for the age group 5-14 to
be aﬀected.
22estimates obtained using the two instruments separately (just identiﬁed models), and
those obtained from the overidentiﬁed model using both instruments, which also allows
us to perform an overidentiﬁcation test (Hansen J statistic). We report the results both
when worker’s experience, seniority and the percentage of female workers are matched
by ﬁrm sector (see section 5.1.2), i.e. models (1)-(3), and when the same variables are
matched by ﬁrm size, i.e. models (4)-(6).
For white collars, IV diagnostics show the relevance of the instruments, and their
validity in the overidentiﬁed models. The spillover estimates range between 1.3 percent
and 1.6 percent. By contrast, as we already saw in section 5.1.2, the IV estimates
show evidence of a positive eﬀect of the college share on blue-collar wages, which is
not necessarily indicative of a spillover, only when workers’ controls are matched by
province-sector-skill cells.
Overall, IV estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the OLS
results.
6 Concluding remarks
The idea that local human capital could produce positive production externalities is both
intuitive and compelling but the empirical evidence on local human capital spillovers is
still ‘mixed’.
The emergence and magnitude of human capital externalities are probably country
and sector speciﬁc. In particular, positive externalities could be more likely to emerge in
countries and sectors specializing in complex technologies and hi-tech products (‘knowl-
edge economies’ or hi-tech sectors) compared to countries and industries specialized in
traditional sectors and unskilled-intensive products like Italy.
In this paper, we use a unique cross-section data set combining ﬁrms’ balance sheet
and survey data, Census data on local human capital and administrative data on earn-
ings to investigate the presence of human capital spillovers in Italian manufacturing.
In particular we focus on spillovers originating from the share of graduate workers in
Manufacturing at province level, and we investigate whether ﬁrms located in provinces
with a larger college share paid in 2001 (the year of the Italian Census) higher wages
than otherwise similar ﬁrms located in provinces with a smaller stock of human capital.
Using OLS we ﬁnd that even after controlling for a variety of ﬁrm and local char-
acteristics, there is a robust positive correlation between average wages paid by ﬁrms,
especially to white collars, and local human capital. Although the possibility that un-
observed province heterogeneity may partly explain these eﬀects cannot be completely
ruled out, we provide several pieces of evidence suggesting that the eﬀects we estimated
23are likely to reﬂect local knowledge spillovers. Indeed, when we allow the eﬀect of local
human capital to vary by type of sector, and control for province ﬁxed eﬀects, the esti-
mates remain positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, the eﬀect of local human
capital on wages is larger in sectors where the main sources of knowledge are outside the
ﬁrm. We also show that unlike the college share in manufacturing, the college share in
the population and in the workforce have much smaller positive eﬀects on average wages
in manufacturing and are never statistically signiﬁcant. This is what one would predict
if our estimates were capturing knowledge spillovers, as the transmission of productivity-
enhancing knowledge is more likely to take place among workers working in the same
sector, and performing similar tasks.
In order to address the issue of potential endogeneity of local human capital with
respect to productivity and wages, we use an IV strategy. We propose as instruments
the lagged change (1990-1995) in the university supply of manufacturing-related de-
gree courses, i.e. degree courses whose graduates are more likely to ﬁnd employment
in Manufacturing, and its interaction with 20-year lagged demographic structure. We
argue that the expansion of HE supply that took place in Italy during 1990-1995 was
both sizeable, thanks to a reform that eased both the opening of new campuses and
of new degree courses by HE institutions, and presumably exogenous. Our IV esti-
mates are qualitatively consistent with the OLS estimates, although somewhat larger in
magnitude.
Our analysis shows overall that positive human capital spillovers also exist in rela-
tively less technologically advanced countries (and industries) compared to the US such
as Italy.
What are the policy implications of our analysis? Firstly, the existence of substantial
positive productive externalities suggests that the burden of HE should not be com-
pletely moved towards university students and their families, since this might produce
a sub-optimal investment in higher education, and that tertiary education expenditures
should be partly ﬁnanced by the general taxation. Secondly, although from the eﬃciency
point of view is not clear whether it would be optimal for a country’s economic growth to
concentrate the supply of HE in a limited number of HE institutions instead of spreading
it geographically like it happened in the last two decades, as our analysis suggested the
potential existence of non-linearities in the eﬀect of local human capital, from an equity
point of view our analysis suggests that such a regional policy of concentration of the
HE supply would be likely to exacerbate regional diﬀerences in productivity and wages,
unless there is a substantial increase in Italian workers’ geographical mobility.
24Appendix
Appendix I. Variables description
Wages. Firm’s average wages data by skill level, our dependent variable, comes from the
Italian National Social Security Institute’s administrative archives. They are full-time
adjusted average earnings by skill-level (white collars and blue collars) of all workers
employed by the ﬁrm in Euros. For more details see Appendix II. Data refer to 2001.
The variable is included in natural logarithm.
Local college share. It is the share of manufacturing workers with tertiary education
who are resident in the province (NUTS 3) in which the ﬁrm is located computed
using the public use microdata ﬁle of 2001 Italian Census (ISTAT). In the Census are
considered as residents those individuals who usually live in the province even if at the
date of the Census they were temporarily absent.
Population share with college education. It is the share of population with tertiary
education in the province computed using the public use microdata ﬁle of 2001 Italian
Census.
Worker share with college education. It is the share of all workers with tertiary
education in the province computed using the public use microdata ﬁle of 2001 Italian
Census.
Firm college share. It is the share of workers within the ﬁrm with tertiary education.
Data refers to 2000 and come from the 8th wave of SIMF (see section 4).
Firm (upper) secondary school share. It is the share of workers within the ﬁrm with
upper secondary education. Data refers to 2000 and come from the 8th wave of SIMF
(see section 4).
Male unemployment rate 15-24. It is the province male unemployment rate among
men aged 15-25 in 2001 (source: ISTAT).
College province 2000. It is a dummy that takes value one if a college was present
in the province in 2000 (source: Italian Ministry of Education University and Research
– MIUR).
R&D cooperation with university. It is a dummy that takes value one if the ﬁrm did
cooperate with a university in R&D, information available from the 8th wave of SIMF.
Capital intensity. It is the real physical capital stock per worker in thousands of
Euros. The nominal capital stock is derived from balance sheet data and is evaluated at
the net ‘historical cost’, that is cost originally borne by a ﬁrm to buy the good reduced
by the depreciation measured according to the ﬁscal law (Fondo di ammortamento),
which accounts for obsolescence and use of the good. The real capital stock is obtained
using capital stock deﬂators provided by the Italian National Statistical Institute (cf.
25Moretti, 2004c). All variables are deﬂated with the appropriate three-digit production
price index (ISTAT). Data refer to 2000 and come from the 8th wave of SIMF. The
variable is included in natural logarithm.
R&D intensity. It is the ratio between R&D workers and the total number of workers
within the ﬁrm. Data refer to 2000 and come from the 9th wave of SIMF.
ICT investment. It is a dummy that takes value one if the ﬁrm performed ICT
investments in 1998-2000 and zero otherwise (see section 4). Data come from the 8th
wave of SIMF.
Export. It is a dummy that takes value one if the ﬁrm exported in 2000 and zero
otherwise. Data come from the 8th wave of SIMF.
FDI. It is a dummy that takes value one if the ﬁrm undertook FDI ﬂows in 2000 and
zero otherwise. Data come from the 8th wave of SIMF.
Change in university course density (1990-1995). See Section 5.2 for details on how
the variable was built (source: MIUR).
Population 5-14 ratio in 1982. It is the ratio of 5-14 years old among the whole
population in 1982 (source: ISTAT).
Manufacuturing college. It is a dummy that takes on value one if a technical (en-
gineering, chemistry, and mathematical, physics and natural sciences) or hard social
sciences (economics, business and economics, banking, statistics) faculty was present in
the province in 2000 (source: MIUR).
Average workers’ weekly working hours. It is computed from the Italian 2001 labour
force survey data (ISTAT), and is matched with SIMF by province-sector-skill cells. For
more details see Section 5.1.2
Average workers’ experience (months). It is computed from WHIP (INPS) and is
matched with SIMF either by province-sector-skill or by province-size-skill cells. For
more details see Section 5.1.2
Average workers’ seniority (months). It is computed from WHIP (INPS) and is
matched with SIMF either by province-sector-skill or by province-size-skill cells. For
more details see Section 5.1.2.
Percentage of female workers. It is computed from WHIP (INPS) and is matched
with SIMF either by province-sector-skill or by province-size-skill cells. For more details
see Section 5.1.2.
Sector dummies. 2-digit ATECO sector dummies. ATECO stands for Classiﬁcazione
delle attivit` a economiche, that is an Italian classiﬁcation of economic activities (i.e.
industries) similar to the NACE European classiﬁcation. Data come from the 8th wave
of SIMF.
Region dummies. Region (NUTS 2) dummies. In Italy there are 20 regions. Data
26come from the 8th wave of SIMF.
Appendix II. Earnings data and INPS-SIMF match
i. Matching procedure
To perform the analyses in this paper we linked together two diﬀerent ﬁrm-level data
archives: the Osservatorio sulle Imprese, occupati dipendenti del settore privato non
agricolo e retribuzioni medie annue di operai ed impiegati (Observatory on ﬁrms, non-
agricultural private sector employees and yearly average earnings of blue collars and
white collars) from the Italian National Institute for Social Security administrative
archives (INPS) with the Survey of Italian Manufacturing Firms (SIMF) currently run
by Unicredit banking group (formerly by Capitalia and Mediocredito, respectively).
The Osservatorio is built upon the compulsory contributions forms collected by INPS
from all private Italian ﬁrms with at least one employee on a monthly basis. It includes
high quality data on employment size and earnings broken down by skill level (manual
and non manual workers, cadre and managers, apprentices), plus information on sector
of activity, ﬁrm’s birth and closure dates.
We linked the INPS wave (covering years from 1997 to 2002), to the 8th-9th waves
SIMF panel (covering years from 1998 to 2003) using the ﬁscal ID number as a linkage
key. Probably due to clerical errors in the maintenance of both archives the match was
not perfect, but link failures remained below 2% of SIMF data. Since it is the ﬁrst time
that these data sources have been integrated, we performed some data quality checks to
verify the information coherence on the following common variables: economic activity
code; province where the ﬁrm is legally based; total number of employees. The check
on ﬁrm size tells apart small (< 21 employees), medium (21-150 employees) and big
(>150 employees) ﬁrms, considering a relative diﬀerence threshold of 30%, 20% and
10% respectively. The results were quite satisfactory, and are summarized in the table
below:
Quality of INPS-SIMF match:
Year
1998 1999 2000 2001
% obs. with equal 3-digit activity codes 71 71 71 71
% obs. with coherent ﬁrm size 96 97 97 97
% obs. with same province 93 93 93 93
Since ﬁrm’s province is used to impute local human capital to ﬁrms, in case of discor-
dance between SIMF and INPS data, we used the province in SIMF that was built by
using the municipality in which the ﬁrm is located.
27ii. Average annual wage data
Since the 1990-1994 edition of the Osservatorio the computation of average employees’
earnings has been done by adjusting monthly ﬁrm’s total wage bill to the maximum




× 26 × di
where:
Mrmi: total wage bill share of month i for a full-month;
Mri: actual monthly wage bill share for month i;
Gri: actual number of working days in month i;
di: average number of employees in month i.
For part-time white collars and blue collars the total number of working days is
obtained by dividing by 6.66 the total number of hours indicated in INPS form DM10
(40 weekly hours divided in 6 days). Wages also include employer’s social contributions,
withholding income tax, sick pay, paid overtime work, Christmas bonus, back payments.
Further details are available (in Italian) at:
http://servizi.inps.it/banchedatistatistiche/menu/imprese/main.html
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33Table 1: Descriptive statistics
white collars blue collars
Variable N. obs. Mean S.D. N. obs. Mean S.D.
(ln) average gross annual wage 3,512 10.10 0.25 3,527 9.85 0.17
Local college share 3,512 0.05 0.02 3,527 0.05 0.02
Population share with college education 3,512 12.32 2.70 3,527 12.29 2.69
Workers share with college education 3,512 10.75 2.35 3,527 10.73 2.34
Firm college share 3,512 0.04 0.07 3,527 0.03 0.06
Firm secondary school share 3,512 0.30 0.23 3,527 0.30 0.23
Male unemployment rate 15-24 3,512 15.97 13.36 3,527 15.99 13.42
College province 2000 (D) 3,512 0.99 0.10 3,527 0.99 0.10
R&D cooperation with university (D) 3,512 0.04 0.20 3,527 0.04 0.20
Capital intensity (ln) 3,512 -3.87 1.16 3,527 -3.85 1.15
R&D intensity 3,512 0.03 0.07 3,527 0.03 0.06
ICT investments (D) 3,512 0.79 0.41 3,527 0.78 0.41
Firm’s size (,00) 3,512 6.79 22.62 3,527 6.66 22.48
Export (D) 3,512 0.68 0.47 3,527 0.68 0.47
FDI (D) 3,512 0.02 0.14 3,527 0.02 0.13
Change in university course density (90-95) 3,512 0.18 0.27 3,527 0.18 0.27
Population 5-14 ratio in 1982 3,512 0.15 0.01 3,527 0.15 0.01
Manufacturing college (D) 3,512 0.18 0.38 3,527 0.18 0.38
Average weekly working hours 2,981 38.51 5.09 3,227 37.31 4.59
Workers’ controls merged by size
Average experience (months) 3,446 176.19 49.52 3,525 178.45 35.09
Average seniority (months) 3,446 82.56 27.49 3,525 72.93 18.52
Percentage of female workers (months) 3,446 0.48 0.21 3,525 0.27 0.21
Workers’ controls merged by sector
Average experience (months) 3,510 162.63 28.07 3,527 178.25 22.62
Average seniority (months) 3,510 73.12 14.46 3,527 70.60 12.48
Percentage of female workers 3,510 0.47 0.10 3,527 0.29 0.08
Note. Descriptive statistics refer to the main white-collar and blue-collar estimation samples in Tables
2 and 3. Averages and standard deviations (S.D.) of weekly working hours and workers’ controls
are computed only for the non-missing observations in the main estimation samples. For a detailed


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 4: Robustness checks (OLS)
Controls/Interactions white collars blue collars
(1) working hours 0.99*** [0.23] 0.60*** [0.18]
(province/sector) (2,981) (3,227)
0.98*** [0.23] 0.60*** [0.18]
(2) experience, seniority, % females 0.70** [0.27] 0.50** [0.19]
(province/sector) (3,446) (3,525)
0.71** [0.29] 0.40* [0.22]
(3) experience, seniority, % females 0.88*** [0.30] 0.05 [0.24]
(province/size) (3,510) (3,527)
0.68** [0.29] 0.41* [0.22]
(4) (1)+(2) 0.97*** [0.23] 0.62*** [0.18]
(2,958) (3,226)
0.99*** [0.23] 0.60*** [0.18]
(5) (1)+(3) 1.12*** [0.22] 0.33* [0.20]
(2,980) (3,227)
0.98*** [0.23] 0.60*** [0.18]
(6) province ﬁxed eﬀects:
Local College Share (LCS) 1.53*** [0.38] 1.53*** [0.22]
Supplier-Dominated and Specialised Suppliers × LCS 1.07** [0.44] 0.13 [0.25]
(7) population share with tertiary education(a) 0.22 [0.34] 0.16 [0.25]
(8) workers share with tertiary education(a) 0.26 [0.38] 0.16 [0.28]
(9) ﬁrm size:
LCS × small ﬁrm (≤50 workers) 0.77** [0.37] 0.40 [0.26]
(2,719) (2,748)
LCS × large ﬁrm (>50 workers) 1.01** [0.47] 0.56** [0.23]
(793) (779)
(10) quality of graduates 0.88** [0.36] 0.25 [0.30]
(11) non-linearities:
LCS -1.52 [2.05] -1.16 [1.70]
square of LCS 17.02 [14.52] 12.13 [11.93]
(12) non-linearities:
LCS below median 1.32*** [0.34] 0.77*** [0.26]
LCS above median 2.36*** [0.65] 1.35*** [0.49]
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%
Note. The dependent variable is the average (ln) full-time annual wage at the ﬁrm level. When it is not
diﬀerently speciﬁed, each row reports the coeﬃcient on the local college share (LCS) estimated from a
separate regression adding the controls reported in the ﬁrst column in the speciﬁcation (8) in Tables
2 and 3 (base speciﬁcation), for white collars and blue collars, respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors clustered at province level in brackets. Since the additional controls are not available
for all observations in the original sample, the ﬁgure in italics reports the coeﬃcient on local human
capital obtained from the base speciﬁcation estimated in the same sample, whose size is reported in
parentheses. Observations are weighted to population proportions. For the description of the variables
see Appendix A. (a) This variable is not included as a control, but as an explanatory variable replacing
local college share.
37Table 5: Wage equations for white collars and blue collars (IV)
Instruments and diagnostics white collars blue collars
Workers’ controls matched by ﬁrm sector(a)
(1) change in university course density(b) 1.30*** [0.40] 0.74** [0.30]
F-test instrument 16.44 12.71
Partial R2 instrument 0.46 0.42
(2) change in univ. course density × 1.33*** [0.42] 0.81*** [0.30]
population 5-14 ratio in 1982
F-test instrument 19.94 17.86
Partial R2 instrument 0.45 0.43
(3) (1) + (2) 1.30*** [0.39] 0.79*** [0.30]
F-test instruments 8.99 8.37
Partial R2 instruments 0.46 0.43
Hansen J statistic 1.05 (0.31) 2.07 (0.15)
N. observations 2,958 3,226
Workers’ controls matched by ﬁrm size(a)
(4) change in university course density(b) 1.56*** [0.36] 0.43 [0.40]
F-test instrument 0.45 0.34
Partial R2 instrument 15.45 11.66
(5) change in univ. course density × 1.61*** [0.39] 0.52 [0.41]
population 5-14 ratio in 1982
F-test instrument 0.44 0.34
Partial R2 instrument 20.80 16.74
(6) (1) + (2) 1.57*** [0.37] 0.47 [0.40]
F-test instruments 9.45 7.54
Partial R2 instruments 0.45 0.34
Hansen J statistic 1.69 (0.19) 1.97 (0.16)
N. observations 2,980 3,227
*** signiﬁcant at 1%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; * signiﬁcant at 10%
Note. The dependent variable is the average (ln) full-time annual wage at the ﬁrm level. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at province level in brackets. P-values in parentheses. Obser-
vations are weighted to population proportions. For the description of the variables see Appendix A.
(a) Employees’ average experience, seniority and percentage of female workers at the ﬁrm level by skill
level in months; (b) It is the change of manufacturing-related university courses density (per 10 km) at
the province level between 1990 and 1995.
38